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Still Unfair, Still Arbitrary-But Do We Care?
SAMUEL R. GROSS*
Welcome. It is a pleasure to see everybody at this bright and cheery hour
of the morning. My assignment is to try to give an overview of the status of
the death penalty in America at the beginning of the twenty-first century. I
will try to put that in the context of how the death penalty was viewed thirty
years ago, or more, and maybe that will tell us something about how the death
penalty will be viewed thirty or forty years from now.
We will start at 1965, thirty-five years ago. In 1965, the death penalty
was not much on people's minds. In 1965, if you believe the Gallup polls that
were available, 45% of Americans favored the death penalty, and 33%
opposed it. Seven executions took place that year. The following year, 1966,
support was down to 42%, and 47% opposed the death penalty. This was the
one point in American history when the national polls showed more people
opposing the death penalty than favoring it. One execution took place in
1966.
Fast-forward to 1999, last year. Nowadays, public opinion polls are
taken much more frequently, and most show that over 70% of Americans
support the death penalty. In 1999, ninety-eight people were executed in this
country. So far this year, 2000, twenty-five people have been executed, a rate
of about two executions per week. The death penalty is once again not news.
Although you do see it in the newspaper, the death penalty has almost become
an ordinary background fact, but this is a very different death penalty than we
* Thomas and Mabel Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B.,
Columbia College, 1968; J.D., 1973, University of California at Berkeley.
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had at the beginning of the process, in 1965. I want to talk about what
happened in between, how we got from that prehistory of the "modem" death
penalty to the futuristic death. penalty that we have now in the year 2000.
Until the early 1960s, as far as American courts were concerned, the
death penalty was just another punishment. Judges realized, of course, that it
was a more extreme punishment than any other, but its use had not been
challenged on any systematic grounds-and by the 1960s it was not widely
used. As I mentioned, the national execution rate had gone down to only a
few per year.
Around 1965, the death penalty was a common high school and junior
high school debate topic. There were strong and interesting arguments to be
made on both sides. There was a reasonably even division of opinion in the
country, with a lot of people on both sides, and the topic did not evoke strong
passions. It was not an issue on which political fortunes were made or lost,
not an issue that people talked about a lot or berated other people about, and
it was not an issue that excited a great deal of attention in the media. Most
Americans probably did not care much about the death penalty in 1965.
In 1965, the legal status of the death penalty in the United States was
essentially the same as the status of the death penalty in other Western
democracies. In Canada and in most of Western Europe the death penalty was
available as a punishment for murder, at least in theory; but it was rarely used.
Public opinion, there as here, loosely supported the death penalty, but it did
not excite much debate. I suspect that in 1965, most educated people in
Europe, Canada and America, if asked, would have said: "Yes, I guess we
have a death penalty, but it will probably go out of existence." In the decades
that followed, in Canada and in every country in Europe, the death penalty
was in fact abolished, de facto or dejure. Here in America, of course, that did
not happen. I will get back to that difference later.
The modem era in the American death penalty began in the early 1960s,
when the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (the "Legal Defense
Fund") took on the issue.' The Legal Defense Fund initially became
concerned about the death penalty because of increasingly strong evidence
that it was being used in a racially discriminatory manner in the South. This
discrimination was clearest in those cases in which the death penalty was used
for rape. By 1965, a major study of the use of the death penalty for rape
offenders, by Professor Marvin Wolfgang and others, was just getting
underway. This study-now a classic in the field-eventually proved what
most people had suspected: that the death penalty for rape was essentially
1. SeC MICHAEL MELTZNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 3-19 (1974).
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reserved for black men who were convicted of raping white women in
southern states. The initial attacks on the death penalty focused on that issue.
By 1965, the Legal Defense Fund strategy had broadened to an attack on
the death penalty as such. It evolved into a plan to force a moratorium on the
use of the death penalty. It worked. The last execution in this period was in
1967; and there were none from 1968 until 1977. The idea was that this
moratorium would force the Supreme Court to confront basic questions about
the constitutionality of the death penalty. It was a successful strategy, at first.
The Supreme Court was forced to confront the constitutionality of the death
penalty.
The basic argument against the death penalty was that it violates the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. I do not
pretend that this is news to you. I just want to remind you of how odd an
argument this was when the Legal Defense Fund started out with it in 1965,
at a time when the death penalty had never seriously been challenged on
constitutional grounds.
The death penalty is explicitly recognized in the Constitution. The Fifth
Amendment, for example, provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury.... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. ... "' There is no doubt that in 1789, or for that
matter in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the death
penalty was widely used and universally understood to be a legally acceptable
punishment. To say that the death penalty violates these provisions of the
Constitution required saying that the Constitution now prohibits things that the
drafters of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment clearly did not
intend those amendments to prohibit. How did they make that argument?
In 1958, in a case called Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren wrote,
"[tihe [Eighth] Amendment [prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments]
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."3  In other words, the content of this
prohibition, and the nature of the punishments that are prohibited by it, must
change with time. The assumption underlying this description is that society
will increasingly prohibit punishments that were permitted in earlier, more
barbaric times. This is a necessary interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments provision of the Eighth Amendment. There is no way around it,
and no Supreme Court Justice since, including conservative originalists such
as Justice Scalia, has challenged it. Why?
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
3. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plurality opinion).
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The reason is that in 1789, when the Eighth Amendment was enacted,
many punishments were permitted that we would never consider tolerating
today. Flogging and ear cropping were just two forms of mutilation and
torture that were commonly available in 1789. Nobody would say that they
are constitutional now. As a result, the Court has accepted the idea that the
Eighth Amendment has to be reinterpreted periodically to fit with
contemporary standards of decency and due process.
How does this standard apply to the death penalty? Specifically, if the
definition of a cruel and unusual punishment is a punishment that
contemporary society rejects, how can one argue that the Supreme Court
should prohibit it? After all, this is a democracy. If contemporary American
society rejects capital punishment, then contemporary society will prohibit it
by legislative action. We elect our legislators and executive officers, and they
decide what types of punishment are no longer permitted-just as legislatures
prohibited flogging and ear cropping in the nineteenth century, without
intervention from the Supreme Court.
Any argument that the death penalty violates the cruel and unusual
punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment had to address the claim that
this was an issue that should be left to the elected branches of government.
The Legal Defense Fund dealt with this problem by focusing on the reality of
the death penalty in America at that time. They argued that because the death
penalty had become so uncommon, because it was such a marginal issue,
because it affected so few people-and powerless, isolated people at that-it
was the sort of issue on which legislatures could not be expected to effectively
reflect contemporary values. There was no constituency that demanded that
the government attend to this problem. An occasional person would be
executed at the end of a long and convoluted legal process, for a crime that
was no different than--or perhaps not as bad as-crimes for which many
other people were not executed. Most voters might disapprove of this result
if they knew about it, but they rarely noticed, so the issue could never
command legislative attention. The death penalty was so unpredictable and
uncommon that it never made it onto anybody's legislative agenda.
The Legal Defense Fund also argued that if the public understood how
the process works, it would disapprove of the process as it in fact operated.
But because the death penalty was so rare, it had simply dropped from public
view.
This was a plausible argument when it was first advanced in the late
1960s and early 1970s. The Legal Defense Fund carried this argument to the
Supreme Court decision in 1972, in the seminal case on which the
[Vol. 26
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constitutional jurisprudence of the death penalty in America rests, Furman v.
Georgia.'
Of the many issues that the Court had before it in Furman, the central
one was this: Was the death penalty, as of that time, acceptable to late-
twentieth century American society? The Court reached no decision on that
issue in 1972. What the Court did instead-in an extremely confusing 5 to 4
decision-was hold that the death penalty, as it operated at that time, was
unconstitutionally "arbitrary" because it singled out a few randomly selected
individuals for execution from a much larger group who was spared that fate.
Some of the Justices in the majority were also troubled by the apparent
discrimination in the use of the death penalty against blacks and other
minorities, and against poor people. As a result, all death penalty statutes in
effect in 1972 were declared unconstitutional, and all death penalty sentences
were vacated. The net effect of Furman was that the Supreme Court cleared
all death rows in America, continued the moratorium on executions that was
then in effect, and created a lengthy hiatus in the use of the death penalty.
At that time, in the 1960s and early 1970s, moratoria on capital
punishment were fairly common in Western countries. In other countries,
however, they were imposed by legislatures or government ministers rather
than by judges. Also--outside the United States-a moratorium was always
a stepping stone to abolition. This happened in Great Britain where capital
punishment was abolished in 1969, and it happened in Canada, where it was
abolished in 1976. In several countries abolition came despite continued
public support for the death penalty.' In Great Britain, for example, support
for the death penalty actually increased for an extended period after abolition,
and then eventually decreased, some twenty years later. Today, a majority of
Britons would probably still say that they would like to have the death penalty
restored, although they do not expect it to happen. I also do not think that they
much care.
The pattern in the United States has obviously been very different. After
the Furman decision by the Supreme Court in 1972, support for the death
penalty increased. It went from 53% in 1972, to 60% in 1976, when the
Supreme Court revisited the issue. More important, by 1976 thirty-five states
had enacted new statutes restoring the death penalty, with procedural
modifications that were intended to reduce the "arbitrariness" that had led to
the invalidation of all death penalty statutes in effect in 1972. These events
severely undermined the claim that the death penalty was a barbaric relic that
was left behind because it was too unimportant to make it onto the political
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. See Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13 STUD. L
POL. AND SOC'Y 71, 89-90 (1993).
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agenda. Not surprisingly, when the constitutionality of the death penalty came
back to the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,6 the Court said that capital
punishment is acceptable to contemporary American society. The Court also
held that the new modified death penalty statutes promised to address the
"arbitrariness" that led to the invalidation of earlier capital sentencing
schemes in Furman. In sum, the Court in Gregg gave its constitutional stamp
of approval to several new death penalty laws, and ushered in the "modem"
period in capital punishment in America.
According to the Supreme Court in Gregg, the strongest evidence that
society endorsed capital punishment was the large number of state legislatures
that had restored the penalty after Furman. Why did this happen? Why the
resurgence of support for the death penalty after it was temporarily invalidated
in 1972? Professors Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins7 have argued that
this was a reaction to the Court's decision-that in many states people felt
aggrieved and angry because the Court had taken away their beloved death
penalty. Thus, in response, even larger numbers came out to support it. There
is much to this explanation, but there are other explanations as well.First, crime in the United States was increasing dramatically. The Court,
I think, did not quite appreciate the significance of this trend in 1972. From
the mid 1960s to the late 1970s, the homicide rate in the United States more
than doubled, and the violent crime rate nearly tripled. As everybody who
lived through that period knows, the rising crime rates caused big changes in
people's lifestyles. They also generated a major public reaction against what
was seen to be an increasingly dangerous situation. Increased support for the
death penalty was part of that reaction.
Second, the criminal justice system in America has always been much
more political than in other Western democracies. Initially, and still most
importantly, it is political at the local level. As you all know, we have elected
prosecutors and elected sheriffs in almost every county in the United States.
We have elected police chiefs in many cities, and where they are not elected
they are usually appointed by other elected local officials. We also have
elected trial court and appellate court judges in almost all states-judges who
apply the law while looking over their shoulders and worrying how their
rulings will play out at the ballot box. This is a uniquely American
phenomenon. Europeans think that an elected judiciary is not merely weird,
but barbaric.
Because all of these criminal justice officials must get elected to office,
and because many of them-conspicuously prosecutors-use their experience
6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA (1986).
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in the criminal justice system to run for higher office, criminal justice has
always been an electoral issue at the local and state levels in the United States.
In the late 1960s, crime became an electoral issue at the national level as well.
Eventually, in the late 1980s, the death penalty became a central part of the
national politics of crime.
Let me give you a couple of examples: In 1984, Walter Mondale was
defeated by President Ronald Reagan. Does anyone here know what Walter
Mondale's position on the death penalty was? It did not surface in the
campaign. In fact, he was opposed to it. Mondale is from Minnesota, which
has not had the death penalty since 1911, but I doubt if one voter in a hundred
knew this in 1984. Jimmy Carter was not opposed to capital punishment-
after all, he was the governor of Georgia-but he was only in favor of it for
a narrow, restricted set of cases. That never surfaced either when he ran for
president, in 1976 and 1980. On the other hand, in 1988, when Michael
Dukakis ran for president against George Bush, the fact that he opposed the
death penalty was a central element of the campaign against him, and was very
destructive. Of course, in 1992, when Bill Clinton ran for president against
George Bush, he made a point of interrupting his campaign to go back to
Arkansas to preside over the execution of a brain-damaged prisoner. It
worked; he was elected. In the process, a new political fact was cemented in
place: any major-party candidate for president of the United States for the
foreseeable future must swear allegiance to the death penalty.
The same change has occurred at the state level. Jerry Brown, who is
now the mayor of Oakland, was elected Governor of California in 1974, and
in 1978. He was always opposed to the death penalty, and this was a well-
known public position. Nonetheless, he was re-elected in 1978 on the same
ballot in which Californians voted overwhelmingly for a pro-death penalty
initiative. The issue had little impact on his campaign. That could never
happen now. Nowadays, candidates for governor of California compete to
show that-they are more in favor of the death penalty than their opponents.
For the moment, political debate about the death penalty in America is
over. Everybody is on one side. There are still opponents of the death penalty
in public office, but they avoid the issue. The governor of my own state,
Michigan-John Engler-is opposed to the death penalty. But he never talks
about it in public because it might hurt him politically. Fortunately, there is
no death penalty in Michigan, and-so far-it has not become a major
political issue.
What about the issue that the Supreme Court did deal with in Furman in
1972, the question of how the death penalty was administered? The Court
decided in Furman that as the penalty was imposed at that time, it was so
arbitrary and potentially discriminatory that it was unconstitutional. When the
Court got the issue back in Gregg in 1976, it upheld several new death penalty
statutes that attempted to provide guidance to juries in deciding whether or not
2000]
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to send defendants to their death. The Court held that these new death penalty
laws had the potential to cure the arbitrariness in the use of the death penalty
that led to the decision in Furman.
For the first several years after the Gregg decision in 1976, the Supreme
Court, in my opinion, tried contentiously to apply its decisions in Gregg and
in Furman, and make the death penalty operate in a predictable, even-handed,
non-discriminatory way. It tried to come up with a system in which the death
penalty could be imposed without randomly choosing some people for
execution over others, or discriminating on the basis of race or some other
impermissible basis. It didn't work. Because of the new procedural
requirements, the increased attention to death penalty cases, and the more
careful review of death penalty cases by all courts (and federal courts in
particular)-there were almost no executions. In 1976, there were none; in
1977, there was one; in 1978, none; in 1979, two; in 1980, none; in 1981, one;
and in 1982, two. Over a period of seven years, we had fewer than one
execution per year in the entire country. And yet, the death penalty occupied
a very large portion of the Supreme Court's time and generated dozens if not
hundreds of cases in the federal courts.
This all changed in 1983, when the Supreme Court started a process of
dismantling the procedural protections that were supposed to make the death
penalty operate in a non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary manner. I will not take
time to go over the details because it is a complicated story, and has been
often told.8 Suffice it to say that in a series of decisions the Court held that
most of the procedural requirements that it seemed to impose on capital
punishment in 1972 and 1976 were not in fact required. In addition, the Court
started to speed up the review of death penalty cases, in particular by cutting
back on their review in federal courts by way of federal habeas corpus. The
total process of dismantling took years, and eventually Congress got in on the
act. But the change in 1983 was immediate. In 1983 itself-half of which
followed the end of the Supreme Court term -there were five executions. In
1984, there were twenty-one. The process sped up again in the early 1990s,
and has continued to accelerate through last year, when we had nearly 100
executions last year.
The low point in the dismantling of the constitutional protections that
govern capital punishment came in 1987, in the case of McKleskey v. Kemp.9
Until then, the challenges to the death penalty were all in the following form:
The procedure that was used by the State of Texas (or Ohio, or Illinois) to
sentence this defendant to death was unconstitutional because it did not live
up to the requirements of Furman and Gregg. These were attacks on
8. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 305.
9. 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
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procedures as such. Starting in 1983, the Court kept saying, in effect: "That's
not what we meant. You're reading too much into Furman and Gregg. Those
procedures we mentioned are not really necessary. It is not as difficult to meet
the constitutional requirements as you supposed."
In McKleskey, the challenge was different; it was a challenge to the
outcomes of the system of capital sentencing. The Supreme Court was
presented with compelling evidence that into the 1980s the death penalty in
the State of Georgia operated in a manner that discriminated on the basis of
race. The strongest finding was that defendants convicted for killing white
victims were far more likely to be sentenced to death than defendants
convicted of killing black victims. The Court said: Let's assume that this is
all true; even so, it's not unconstitutional. That type of racial disparity in the
application of the death penalty is just something we have to put up with.
Many people consider McCleskey one of the most disturbing cases in the
history of the Supreme Court. And it is profoundly disturbing that twenty-four
years after Brown v. Board of Education, 1 the Supreme Court could say that
unequal application of the death penalty based on race is tolerable. And yet,
this is probably a position that most Americans would agree with. Public
opinion polls show that most people in this country believe that the death
penalty is used in a manner that discriminates on the basis of race and wealth,
and that they support it nonetheless.
So where are we now? Skipping many, many details, it looks like the
death penalty is once again in a stable state. Once again it is not subject to
serious challenge, and once again it is not exactly news. But it is also
certainly not the same as it was thirty-five years ago.
From a legal standpoint, the death penalty is now on the Supreme Court's
agenda, apparently permanently. The Justices deal with a fairly steady diet of
death penalty cases. That has consequences down the line, as the lower
federal courts and the state courts are required to consider death penalty cases
with greater care than anybody would have imagined in the early 1960s.
The death penalty is a much bigger industry than it was thirty-five years
ago. There are more death penalty prosecutions, and there are far more
executions than there were in the 1960s. Overall, legal defense in capital
cases is much better, although it is extremely uneven. Many defendants fall
through the cracks. There are terrible, notorious cases of defense attorneys
who come to court drunk, sleep through capital trials, never talk to their
clients before trial, or never call any witnesses. This happens on a regular
basis, and it is shocking and shameful. On the other side, however, the high
end of capital defense work, at trial and on appeal, is much higher than it was
in the early 1960s. These cases generate a steady stream of very well-
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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developed, well-presented, and well-argued challenges to the administration
of the death penalty. The net result is that judicial review of capital cases is,
on the whole, considerably more exacting now than it was in the early 1960s.
By contrast, executive review for clemency has almost entirely
disappeared in capital cases in America. Before 1965, many people who were
sentenced to death were not executed, not because their sentences were
reversed by a court, but because they were commuted by governors. Now,
most governors believe that granting commutations is politically risky, and
they rarely do it.
But has the death penalty really become a fixed, stable institution in
American life? That's how it looks, and yet in the last few years cracks have
begun to appear.
First, I want to get back to Europe. As I mentioned, the death penalty has
now been abolished everywhere in Europe. But the difference goes deeper
than that. In this country, to the extent that there is any debate about the death
penalty, it focuses on its application in one context or another: Does a
particular defendant deserve the death penalty? Is it cost-effective
punishment? Can we use it fairly? Is it subject to racial discrimination? Are
innocent people condemned to die? These issues are discussed in Europe as
well, but the basic point of view of most European judges and lawyers is much
simpler. As they see it, the death penalty-like torture-is a violation of
fundamental human rights. Just as it is the policy of the United States to
oppose violations of human rights in other countries, it is the policy of several
European countries, conspicuously Great Britain, to oppose the imposition of
the death penalty as a violation of human rights. A central aspect of this
policy is constant pressure to get the United States to abandon capital
punishment. Since we are Americans, we think we know better. We are not
much interested in world opinion, or in the views of even our closest allies.
But that could change.
Second, since 1976, some eighty-five people who were sentenced to
death have been released from death row because it has been proven that they
were innocent--that they did not commit the murders for which they were
condemned. This is a shocking number. In other countries, when something
like this happens once-when a single individual who was convicted of
murder is determined to be innocent and released-it causes an uproar. As
often as not, a commission is appointed to investigate why this one person was
erroneously convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Here, year after
year, dozens of people who have been sentenced to death are released because
of proven miscarriages ofjustice-and we shrug. Finally, however, in the last
two years, the magnitude of this horror seems to be sinking in.
Third, in 1997, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates
called for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty. The ABA did not call
for the abolition of capital punishment but for its suspension. They did so for
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several reasons: because of the continuing problem of ineffective capital
defense counsel, which plagues many death penalty cases; because the
Congress and Supreme Court have so limited access to the federal courts that
they no longer serve the necessary function of ensuring the fairness of capital
punishment; because of continuing racial discrimination in the use of the death
penalty; because of the particular uses of the death penalty that are considered
to be a separate human rights violation by almost every other country in the
world-the execution of juveniles for crimes committed before the age of
eighteen, and the execution of mentally ill defendants; because of the general
need to insure fairness and due process in the procedures by which the death
penalty is imposed; and because of the obvious need for additional safeguards
to minimize risk of executing innocent defendants. The ABA is not exactly
a radical organization. It is a striking fact that this centrist organization,
representing a large cross section of the American bar, has taken such a
position.
That same year, the Nebraska legislature voted for a moratorium on the
death penalty. The governor vetoed the bill, but as a result there is a de facto
moratorium on the death penalty in Nebraska while the issue is being studied.
This year, the governor of Illinois imposed a moratorium on the use of the
death penalty in that state because of the large number of innocent defendants
who have been released from death row in Illinois--thirteen since the death
penalty was restored in 1976, in a state in which twelve capital defendants
have been executed.
Finally, there is some recent evidence that support for the death penalty
may be decreasing. From the early 1980s through the late 1990s, it was
always in the range of 70% to 75%. In the best recent poll from 1998, the
General Social Survey by the National Opinion Research Center in Chicago,
support was down to 68%. On several polls this year it comes in around 66%.
This is still a high level support for the death penalty, but these polls could
indicate that support has peaked and may have begun to drop off.
And what next? Obviously, I do not have an answer. On the one hand,
capital punishment is now an established fact in American life. On the other
hand, new problems and new opposition are emerging. Perhaps the death
penalty will survive for decades-problems, opposition and all. Or perhaps
support will begin to erode, and sometime in the near future the landscape will
change again.
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